Peer-reviewed Articles

Abstract This study pushes our understanding of research reliability by reproducing and replicating claims from 110 papers in leading economic and political science journals. The analysis involves computational reproducibility checks and robustness assessments. It reveals several patterns. First, we uncover a high rate of fully computationally reproducible results (over 85%). Second, excluding minor issues like missing packages or broken pathways, we uncover coding errors for about 25% of studies, with some studies containing multiple errors. Third, we test the robustness of the results to 5,511 re-analyses. We find a robustness reproducibility of about 70%. Robustness reproducibility rates are relatively higher for re-analyses that introduce new data and lower for re-analyses that change the sample or the definition of the dependent variable. Fourth, 52% of re-analysis effect size estimates are smaller than the original published estimates and the average statistical significance of a re-analysis is 77% of the original. Lastly, we rely on six teams of researchers working independently to answer eight additional research questions on the determinants of robustness reproducibility. Most teams find a negative relationship between replicators' experience and reproducibility, while finding no relationship between reproducibility and the provision of intermediate or even raw data combined with the necessary cleaning codes.

Abstract Are populist messages more effective at political mobilization? While some theorize populism increases participation by channeling popular discontent, others suggest it discourages engagement through cynicism. Despite its importance, little causal evidence exists on populism's mobilization effects. Using a pre-registered survey experiment on a nationally representative US sample, we test the effects of populist rhetoric—including both anti-elitism and people-centrism—on various mobilization outcomes across the political spectrum. We find that populist messages do not significantly increase political engagement relative to non-populist alternatives of equivalent ideological content. These null results hold for self-reported willingness to vote, participate in political activities, and sign petitions, as well as across party identification. Our findings suggest that populism's perceived power to mobilize may be overstated, with implications for understanding the drivers of political engagement in democratic societies.

Abstract The "Great Replacement Theory" (GRT) is an extremist narrative that has gained increased prominence within anti-immigration and conspiratorial discourse in Western societies, yet remains understudied. We first conceptualize the GRT as a narrative that explicitly claims that white majorities are being deliberately replaced by non-white immigrants in a secretive attempt by malevolent elites to undermine Western nations. Second, we devise measures of agreement with the GRT's several incremental components. Third, using original representative survey data from Germany, we explore and demonstrate widespread belief in even the most extreme propositions of the GRT and examine how these beliefs vary according to sociodemographics, conspiratorial tendencies, and political preferences. While further research is needed, our descriptive findings provide insight into the perhaps underestimated extremism of anti-immigration attitudes among some citizens and highlight the need for more nuanced assessments of immigration attitudes—and attitudes in general—beyond simple spectral measures.

Abstract Why do some areas experience lower voter turnout even under compulsory voting systems? This paper examines the impact of migration turnover—encompassing both in- and out-migration—on voter turnout across communities. While past research has focused on migrant/non-migrant differences or in-/out-migration separately, we propose that both migratory movements tend to decrease political participation due to increased transaction and social costs. Using surveys and a new panel dataset combining census and voting records from over 5,600 Brazilian municipalities, we identify a robust negative association between local migratory turnover and voter turnout. This relationship holds across different time frames, levels of aggregation, analytical approaches, and variable definitions. Individual-level data analyses further corroborate these results. Additional tests suggest social costs constitute a key mechanism deterring turnout. These findings highlight the need to consider the broader consequences of population mobility for democratic processes and representation, particularly in areas experiencing higher levels of turnover.

Abstract The US public is mostly ignorant about basic immigration knowledge. While various attempts to correct misperceptions have generally failed to change people's minds about the issue, it is possible that this failure has been the result of not providing relevant information. We argue that informing the public about the difficulty of the legal immigration admission process is an effective, perspective-changing way to raise support for more open immigration policies. We test and confirm this hypothesis using a nationally representative US survey experiment (N = 1000) that informs respondents about US immigration's administrative burdens and restrictions through short verifiable narratives. We also provide the first evidence of the widespread ignorance about the immigration process across diverse political and demographic groups. Our results suggest that providing a better understanding of the immigration process' difficulty has more promise to change public policy preferences than challenging skeptics' crystallized beliefs about immigration's effects or numbers.

Abstract How can public opinion change in a pro-immigration direction? Recent studies suggest that those who support immigration care less about it than those who oppose it, which may explain why lawmakers do not enact pro-immigration reforms even when voters are pro-immigration. To see if the personal issue importance of immigration can be changed, I conducted a probability-based, nationally representative US survey experiment (N = 3,450) exposing respondents to verifiable arguments about the broad national benefits of expanding legal immigration and the costs of not doing so. Using new measures of issue importance, my descriptive results show that only one-fifth of voters who prioritize the issue have a pro-immigration preference. Furthermore, while anti-immigration respondents prioritize policies regarding law enforcement and (reducing) future immigration, pro-immigration respondents prioritize (helping) immigrants already here. The experimental results confirm that the provided arguments raised immigration's importance among pro-immigration voters but did not backfire by mobilizing anti-immigration voters. Contrary to expectations, the arguments increased pro-immigration policy preferences, but did not change voters' subissue priorities within immigration or their willingness to sign a petition. Overall, the treatment was effective beyond changing minds by shifting stated issue positions and priorities in a pro-immigration direction. It can thus be used in a nontargeted information campaign to promote pro-immigration reforms.

Abstract A long-standing scholarship argues that greater ethnic diversity harms social cohesion. However, recent research also suggests that these outcomes are primarily influenced by the strength of state institutions. We evaluate these arguments using new geocoded historical data from Brazilian municipalities. Our initial analysis confirms that local racial diversity is negatively associated with social cohesion indicators such as trust, civic participation, belonging, turnout, and crime. Nonetheless, further analysis indicates that this relationship cannot be directly attributed to the effects of diversity, but rather hinges on the concentration of historically (dis)advantaged racial groups within particular areas. Finally, we demonstrate that both the spatial distribution of these groups and current levels of social cohesion are linked to past state capacity across municipalities. These results suggest that local social cohesion is more strongly associated with the historical development of state institutions across the national territory than with their contemporary levels of racial diversity.

Abstract Is populism electorally effective and, if so, why? Scholars agree that populism is a set of people-centric, anti-pluralist, and anti-elitist ideas that can be combined with various ideological positions. It is difficult, albeit important, to disentangle populism from its hosting ideology in evaluating populism's effectiveness and its potential conditional effects on the hosting ideology. We conduct a novel US conjoint experiment asking respondents to evaluate pairs of realistic campaign messages with varying populist-related messages and hosting policy positions given by hypothetical primary candidates. Although party-congruent policy positions are expectedly much more popular, we find that none of the populist features have an independent or combined effect on candidate choice.

Abstract What is the relationship between the electoral success of populist radical right parties (PRRPs) and public attitudes toward immigration? Previous research suggests that PRRP success can lead to more negative attitudes due to the breaking down of anti-prejudice norms and more prominent anti-immigration party cues. However, we argue that greater PRRP success could have a positive relationship with immigration attitudes, reflecting negative partisanship, polarisation, and a desire to re-emphasise anti-prejudice norms, which we call a "reverse backlash effect". Using the best available electoral and public opinion data across the last thirty years in 24 European countries, our TSCS analysis show the predominance of such "reverse backlash effects" across several operationalisations of PRRP success. Our argument has important consequences for the understanding of possible PRRP effects on public opinion, as well as attitudinal formation via party cueing and social norms more generally.

Abstract Do significant pro-immigration reforms—that open legal pathways for labor and family immigration—increase populist voting? Despite the common assumption that such reforms would lead to counter-productive voter backlash informed by the literature on immigrant group threat, the extent to which immigration policy itself influences voters has been unclear. To address this question, this paper estimates the impact of immigration policies on (right-wing) populist voting and immigration attitudes by exploiting the timing of major changes to immigration legislation in a new dataset linking the best available public opinion and policy data across the last forty years in 24 European countries. My analysis shows that, while the absolute levels of immigration policy openness are associated with slightly higher populist voting across countries in a naive cross-sectional analysis, pro-immigration (or anti-immigration) policy changes do not affect populist voting or immigration concerns within countries. This suggests pro-immigration reforms do not backfire due to voter backlash.

Abstract Why do politicians and policymakers not prioritize pro-immigration reforms, even when public opinion on the issue is positive? This research note examines one previously overlooked explanation related to the systematically greater importance of immigration as a political issue among those who oppose it relative to those who support it. To provide a comprehensive empirical assessment of how personal immigration issue importance is related to policy preferences, I use the best available cross-national and longitudinal surveys from multiple immigrant-receiving contexts. I find that compared to pro-immigration voters, anti-immigration voters feel stronger about the issue and are more likely to consider it as both personally and nationally important. This finding holds across virtually all observed countries, years, and alternative survey measures of immigration preferences and their importance. Overall, these results suggest that public attitudes toward immigration exhibit a substantial issue importance asymmetry that systematically advantages anti-immigration causes when the issue is more contextually salient.

Abstract Do voters update their racialized political preferences in response to new information? To answer this long-standing question, we conduct an original survey examining U.S. mainland attitudes toward Puerto Rican statehood, a rare consequential racialized issue of low salience. To test whether public support for statehood can be changed, we embedded an information experiment describing Puerto Rico's political status and its relationship to the U.S. The treatment was designed to increase the perceived connection between the groups through effortful thinking. Descriptively, our results indicate that Americans are generally ambivalent to the idea of Puerto Rico becoming the 51st state. We further find that opposition to statehood is related to anti-immigration attitudes, conservative ideology, and lack of knowledge about the issue. Nonetheless, we also show that highly racialized opposition to statehood can be significantly decreased among all groups of voters by providing simple background information on U.S. and Puerto Rico's relationship.

Abstract How has the COVID-19 pandemic affected public opinion towards immigration? Long-term evidence in Europe and the United States suggests attitudes to immigration are relatively stable and, in some cases, becoming more favorable with high salience masked in the perceived importance of the issue. However, theoretically a global pandemic could exacerbate people's fears of outsiders or that migration may contribute to the disease. By contrast, attitudes could remain stable if their drivers prove to be robust enough to withstand the shock of COVID-19, which may instead highlight the disproportional importance of migrant workers. We draw from Eurobarometer data from 2014 to 2020 across 28 European countries, weekly national survey data during the outbreak from the US, and individual panel data from the UK and Germany to find little systematic change in immigration preferences and no country-level correlation between the observed changes and the severity of the outbreak. Instead, the perceived importance of immigration has consistently and significantly decreased. These findings suggest that, if COVID-19 is to have an impact on attitudes to migration, it is likely to emerge via longer-term means, such as early-life socialization and value change, rather than reactions to the immediate shock of the pandemic.

Abstract Why do communities with larger shares of ethnic and racial minorities have worse public goods provision? Many studies have emphasized the role of diversity in hindering public goods outcomes, but the question of causality remains elusive. We contribute to this debate by tracing the roots of both contemporary racial demography and public goods provision to the uneven historical expansion of the state. Focusing on new historical data from Brazil, we show that municipalities with lower levels of state capacity in the past were more frequently selected by escaped slaves to serve as permanent settlements. Consequently, such municipalities have worse public services and larger shares of Afro-descendants today. These results highlight the pervasive endogeneity of the relationship between ethnic demography and public outcomes. The failure to account for context-dependent historical confounders raises concerns over the validity of previous findings regarding the social costs and benefits of any particular demographic composition.

Abstract Why do some politicians employ populist rhetoric more than others within the same elections, and why do the same politicians employ more of it in some elections? Building on a simple formal theoretical model of two-candidate elections informed by the ideational approach to populist communication, we argue that the initially less popular political actors are more likely to use populist rhetoric in a gamble to have at least some chance of winning. To test the empirical implications of our argument, we construct the most comprehensive corpus of U.S. presidential campaign speeches (1952-2016) and estimate the prevalence of populist rhetoric across these speeches with a novel automated text analysis method utilizing active learning and word embedding. Overall, we show the robustly greater use of populism among the presidential candidates with the lower polling numbers regardless of their partisanship or incumbency status.

Abstract Why is migration unpopular? A vast literature argues that voters oppose immigration because of threatened interests and prejudice. This paper is among the first studies of opposition to migration–the other side of the issue salient in many countries. Departing from existing public opinion research, I develop a number of tests comparing emigration and immigration attitudes and then exploit relevant survey data from 30 countries, as well as the original experimental and qualitative evidence. Overall, I document high opposition to both emigration and immigration in many countries and show that respondents are unlikely to confuse these issues. I then show that individual emigration and immigration attitudes are significantly correlated and have similar predictors, which is reflected in respondents' own open-ended explanations. While consistent with sociotropic accounts, this new evidence suggests that many natives may exhibit an aversion to human mobility between countries in general, not immigration or emigration in particular.

Abstract Do voters have stable immigration views? While any account of immigration politics must make an assumption about whether underlying attitudes are stable, the literature has been ambiguous regarding the issue. To remedy this omission, we provide the first comprehensive assessment of the stability and change of immigration attitudes. Theoretically, we develop a framework to explicate the temporal assumptions in previous research and find that most studies assume attitudes are flexible. Empirically, we draw on nine panel data sets to test the stability question and use multiple approaches to account for measurement error. We find that immigration attitudes are remarkably stable over time and robust to major economic and political shocks. Overall, these findings provide more support for theories emphasizing socialization and stable predispositions rather than information or environmental factors. Consequently, scholars should exercise caution in using changing context to explain immigration attitudes or in using immigration attitudes to explain political change.

Abstract Anti-immigration preferences among educated and racially egalitarian voters is hard to explain using existing frameworks of self-interest or prejudice. I address this puzzle by developing a theory of parochial altruism, which stipulates that voters are motivated to help others at a cost, but they prioritize helping compatriots. I hypothesize that parochial altruism to voters high in both "nationalism" and "altruism" are more supportive of immigration restrictions perceived to be in the national interest. However, parochial altruists are also expected to be more supportive of increasing immigration when it benefits their compatriots. I test my theory by conducting a population-based UK survey. Using a novel measure of elicited preferences, I first find most altruists who donate to domestic rather than global charities are as anti-immigration as egoists who do not donate at all. Using a conjoint experiment, I then show voters support increasing immigration when these alternative policies benefit their compatriots.

Abstract Why do immigrants from particular countries systematically face more opposition? To resolve inconsistencies of prevailing group threat theories, I re-introduce a long-standing hypothesis stipulating that people have a disposition for maintaining status hierarchy between ethnic groups. Accordingly, independent of perceived economic or cultural threat, natives are more likely to prefer immigrant groups of higher status based on the development level of the group's national origin. To test this argument, I exploit a substantial provincial variation of immigration flows and attitudes in Spain–one of the only countries that has received immigrants from both less and more developed countries. Consistent with my hypothesis, I demonstrate that anti-immigration attitudes are more widespread in areas with immigrants from less developed countries regardless of their economic and cultural characteristics. I further document that many voters perceive stable group hierarchies and that these preferences are more predictive of anti-immigration attitudes in lower-status immigration contexts. Overall, these results suggest that even culturally similar and economically beneficial immigrant groups from poorer countries can face public opposition due to their lower-status national origin, highlighting the independent role of group status perceptions in politics.

Abstract How does ethnoracial demography relate to public goods provision? Many studies find support for the hypothesis that diversity is related to inefficient outcomes by comparing diverse and homogeneous communities. We distinguish between homogeneity of dominant and disadvantaged groups and argue that it is often impossible to identify the effects of diversity due to its collinearity with the share of disadvantaged groups. To disentangle the effects of these variables, we study new data from Brazilian municipalities. While it is possible to interpret the prima facie negative correlation between diversity and public goods as supportive of the prominent "deficit" hypothesis, a closer analysis reveals that, in fact, more homogeneous Afro-descendant communities have lower provision. While we cannot rule out that diversity is consequential in other contexts, our results cast doubt on the reliability of previous findings related to the benefits of local ethnoracial homogeneity for public outcomes.

Abstract Does ethnic structure affect the occurrence of civil conflict and, if so, how? This study develops an agent-based model of endogenous grievances which builds on the new constructivist conceptualization of ethnicity and the theories of group inequality and crosscuttingness. Specifically, I simulate conflict as a function of spontaneous economic disparities between nominal 'ethnic groups' with no predefined salient categories and related antagonism. Then I apply the model to reconsider the effect of (bidimensional) ethnic structure on conflict, which has been largely dismissed in recent scholarship. By varying the parameters of ethnic demography in artificial societies, I conduct a series of replicable experiments revealing that various structural settings yield systematically different patterns of conflict. While there is no 'most hazardous' structure per se, both polarization and crosscuttingness appear to decrease the likelihood of violence but increase its potential deadliness, which indicates a more general tradeoff of conflict incidence and intensity.